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Regional Powers and Europeanization process in Spain
1. Introduction

The Spanish transition after Franco’s death and the democratic model established have been underlined as an example of pacific democratisation, unique and exemplar in the whole world. The system of Comunidades Autónomas (Autonomous Communities) gave the firsts steps to achieve the devolution of competencies to the different regions. Now this system is being questioned strongly than ever and different reforms of the regional statutes have appeared in the last years, showing that the regional powers are claiming for more decentralisation and competencies. This reforms covers from almost independent projects, as the rejected on February 2005 by the Spanish parliament, Ibarretxe’s Plan (Basque Country), the highly self-government proposal of Catalan statute¹ (approved by the Spanish Senate on May 2006), to the new Statute of Valencian Community (first reform approved, on September 2005) or the Andalusia case².

Nationality, empowerment of self-government and equality between autonomous communities are the main points of the new statutes. Direct international representation has been one of the most problematic aspects because Spanish constitution only recognises the central-state as unique actor in international matters³. In this sense European Union and its decision-making and implementation process appears as one of the conflictive aspects between central-state and regional forces. After 20 years of Spanish membership in the EU, the European level, especially through its regional policy, is one of the most influential factors on the autonomous communities. And this is actually the main question of this paper, how important the influence of EU and the Regional policy on Spanish institutional system has been, and how deep its influence explains the principal changes and aims of decentralisation within the autonomous governments.

The history of Spanish territorial and institutional organization shows us that it has not been an easy task to solve. Already in the 1920’s one of the best Spanish philosopher, Ortega Gasset highlighted the main problems of Spanish political system, history and even identity. Almost one century after competitive regionalism, outlying nationalism and centralism⁴ are still present in Spanish society.

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Therefore Spanish institutional system is affronting not only the problems within its barriers, but also the challenges derived of the European Integration process. Through the analysis of the Spanish institutional development, especially focusing on the relation between central state and regional governments in European Policy questions, we can distinguish in which level the Europeanization has strengthened the political cooperation of the different levels involved in policy-making (establishing a typical model of multilevel-governance system), and in which others fields the European integration has empowered the role of the Spanish central state or centralization. The Spanish case means without doubt a good example of the consequences of European Integration on decentralised states (semi-federal), and could be an example for other European states of the institutional evolution in order to reach a higher level of proximity to people, therefore more democracy.


The Spanish state is based, till today, on the Constitution of 1978, whose most important innovation is the introduction of a system for distributing territorial power based on the recognition of political autonomy for “Spanish nationalities and regions”\(^5\). In other words, the constitutional experience of 1978 designed a legal framework of intergovernmental relations that empowered the institutional autonomy of the central state and the subnational level of governance\(^6\). But although it was aimed to face the “decentralization challenge”, it did not create a concrete system of territorial organization, but rather established a series of procedures which would allow an ample degree of both political and administrative decentralization. That is the reason why the decentralization in Spain is still a “dynamic process” in which the status of the regions is still changing as we can observe in the Autonomy Accords of 1992\(^7\) or even in the recent new statutes and plans which are going to come in Spanish parliament to be studied. Spain is often presented as a unique case of federalism in terms of its malleable and open-ended nature regarding the division of responsibilities between orders of government. Therefore the conspicuous absence of a clear demarcation of the

\(^7\) López Guerra, Luis: Regions and Nationalitites in Spain: The Autonomous Communities.
competences or clear-cut constitutional division of powers is the defining characteristic of the Spanish case of federalism. Between 1978 and 1983 all the regions in Spain were transformed into “autonomous communities”, which means territorial entities exercising political and administrative autonomy together with central government. The Spanish state was, in this aspect, organized following the American model of dual federalism, based on the separation of central state and regional powers in order to secure the cultural pluralism of Spanish social reality. There are important federal elements like the existence of two levels of institutions, reflected in double parliamentary Instances (Cortes Generales and Autonomous Communities’s Parliaments) double government (President and Central Government-President and Government of all the Autonomous Communities). The main characteristic of the regional government is their political diversity and plurality, having not only represented in their parliaments wide-state political parties, but also regional parties. Another federal factor is the fact that the most important Institutions of the Autonomous Communities –the president, the Parliament, and the government- have a political-representative character. Their origin is the communal elections, therefore bases on it their legitimacy, and is reaffirmed by the Community Statutes. The constitution answer with a wide framework which includes a common proportional representation right of elected Parliament, a government with executive and administrative functions, a president who is elected by Parliament from the circle of its members. All of these elements are known as principle of institutional homogeneity. Finally it is interesting also that the authority of the State is through the constitution regulated and developed by the parliamentary law and orders of Congress and Senate. The autonomous institutions are regulated by their statutes and developed by the autonomous laws and parliamentary each 17 autonomous community.

The Spanish constitution within this federal model distinguishes three different groups of powers to be distributed between state and the autonomous communities depending on to whom is reserved

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the competence\textsuperscript{11}. It differences exclusive competences for the state (Art.150) (where with national
defence, monetary policy and criminal law among others, is included foreign policy), shared
competences between state and autonomous governments, and proper competences of
autonomous communities (Art.149), where the regional government exercise the legislative and
administrative power\textsuperscript{12}. But the constitution does not design explicit authority, but affords them the
possibility of taking over a group of matters listed in the Constitution (Art.148 and 149). This shows
an interesting characteristic in the Spanish case to federal systems that is its regulation of conflicts
between Central State and Autonomous Communities through the Constitutional Court\textsuperscript{13}. The
procedure way reflects how weak the federal structure of the constitution is. The constitutional
court controls the correct application of norms, which the competencies division regulate\textsuperscript{14}.
The existing conflict comes normally because of almost the vast majority of competencies either
are shared or concurrent. The central state’s answers with the development and implementation of
its legal framework, which actually means the legislation of central state without the participation of
Autonomous Communities. As a consequence the intrusion of central state in Autonomous
Communities’ executive functions has been one of the major sources of constitutional conflict
between the central state central and regions\textsuperscript{15}. Spain accounts for the highest level of
constitutional conflict among all decentralized states Europe (over 1000 constitutional conflict in the
Spanish Constitutional Court in 1981-1999 period\textsuperscript{16}), although the statistic reflects than in the last
years the conflict demands from autonomous states has been reduced\textsuperscript{17}
The administration has also maintained its traditional field services at the subnational level, as for
example the “administración periférica del Estado”. This has provoked in many cases the
overlapping and duplication of administrative structures at regional level and constant motive of
intergovernmental tension. Maybe the three more visible problems of the federal reality in Spanish
system to the whole society are its asymmetrical character reflected on the absence of

\textsuperscript{11} Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas de España, in:
\textsuperscript{12} López Guerra, Luis: Regions and Nationalitites in Spain: The Autonomous Communities.. P 151.
\textsuperscript{17} Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas de España:
http://www.map.es/documentacion/politica_autonomica/regimen_juridico.html
correspondence between political and fiscal autonomy and weak role of Senate in decision-making process.

Already in the Constitution it is accepted differences between the autonomous communities, distinguishing on one hand nationalities (Basque, Catalans and the Galician) who argue its status of historical nations; and on the other hand regions, which strive from particular historical prerogatives, geography (e.g. the islands) or for socio-economic regions. The constitution prescribed different routes for both, increasing the division within regional forces, “fast track” and “slow track” concepts are good examples of lack of unity. The fast-lane communities take on more authority, including health and education, which represent about 80 per cent of total policy competence that can be taken on by autonomous communities. Contrarily, the slow track communities may increase their authority and gain access to the maximum level as for example communities like Comunidad Valenciana are doing in the recent years. It is a transitorial or de facto category of asymmetry, and that explain why bilateral and multilateral agreements (central state-autonomous communities) have played a basic role in the assignment of authority and in the well work of intergovernmental relations within Spanish state, allocating the resources and building a cooperative federalism.

In fiscal aspect also present the Spanish system a great asymmetry (de jure) between tax powers of the historic or foral autonomous communities (Basque Country and Navarre) and the so-called “common system”, which applies to the other autonomies. It is based in the recognition of the historic rights of some regions, and brings them much greater level of competences, especially in fiscal matters. The main characteristic is that it entails a maximum level of taxation autonomy which means Basque Country and Navarre have powers to pass legislation, with few limitations, on the main taxes of the Spanish fiscal system. The state is responsible for the provision of some public functions or services within both autonomous communities, and receiving a certain quantity of money known as the cupo. In contradiction, the rest of autonomous communities are financial dependence upon the state because their limited taxation powers and the fact that most of their revenues are provided by the central state through transferences. Despite of important reallocation

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19 op.cit. pp. 45-47.
of taxation powers that occurred in 1997\textsuperscript{20} and 2002\textsuperscript{21} with the reform of ceded taxes, the asymmetry still continues.

While the model of dual federalism conflicts with the fiscal centralization, the weak representation of the autonomous communities at the central-state level corresponds to a vertical distribution that shows an interdependence of the two levels of government. In spite of being defined as “the chamber of territorial representation”\textsuperscript{22} the reality of the Senate is that it does not provide a means for integrating regional interests into national policy-making, and even is understood by the part of the society as a chamber without practical meaning because its weak role in central-state decision-making. The Spanish constitution recognises its right to legal initiative in the Art. 87, but is rarely invoked, and has only a suspending veto power in the second reading of national draw laws as the Art. 90 reflects.

Attending to the weak power of the Senate the Spanish central-state have organized alternative mechanism for intergovernmental coordination, in order to “achieve a cross-regional policy harmonization and a coordinated implementation”\textsuperscript{23} of state policies in all the autonomous communities. The two main tools of cooperation between Spanish central state and the 17 regional governments are the \textit{Conferencias Sectoriales} (sectorial conferences) and the \textit{Convenios de colaboración} (collaboration agreement).

The \textit{Conferencias Sectoriales} exists since 1981 within the project of law of autonomic order (LOAPA), but are legally recognised since 1983. Nowadays there are 25 sectorial conferences\textsuperscript{24} which are basically an “interministerial fora” for an intergovernmental coordination. In our paper the most important sectorial conference is the related with European affairs, but it will be analysed in the next chapter.

On the other hand, the \textit{Convenios de Colaboración} are the major instrumental of formal intergovernmental cooperation on specific issues. They have played an important role in the devolution process to the autonomous communities by delimiting competencies and regulating the transfer of corresponding resources and services from the central state to the regional level. The

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\bibitem{1} Op. cit. pp. 52-53
\bibitem{2} Ministerio de Economía y Hacienda de España: http://www.minhac.es/Portal/Normativa+y+doctrina/Normativa/resultadosNormativa?normativa=Financiacion+Territorial\%3AAutonomica
\bibitem{5} Ministerio de Administraciones Públicas de España. In: http://www.map.es/documentacion/politica_autonomica/cooperacion_autonomica/instrumentos_de_cooperacion/parraf o/01/document_es/REGLAMENTOS_DE_LAS_CONFERENCIA.pdf
\end{thebibliography}
difference with Sectorial Conferences is that the Collaboration agreements are not per se bilateral, because Convenios can be signed between the central-state and several, if not all, autonomous communities. Normally they are bilateral and almost none is negotiated and agreed upon between the Spanish administration and all 17 autonomous governments.

Once introduced the institutional framework of Spanish state, especially the intergovernmental cooperation between central-state and autonomous governments, I will analyse first the development of competencies in European decision-making and implantation process, from the initial confrontation between autonomous communities till the beginning of a multi-level-governance system.

3. European integration: influences on institutional relations on the relations between autonomous communities and central state.

The European integration process has gone over the barriers of national state. The reform of the structural funds in 1988 for example defined “partnership” as: “close consultation between the Commission, the member states concerned and the competent authorities designated by the latter at national, regional, local or other level, with each party acting as partner of a common goal”.

This partnership principle was an attempt to make regional policy more effective by involving formally the local and regional actors most familiar with the problems and priorities of targeted regions. It meant that regional policy, for the first time would be a policy not just for the regions, but also by the regions. The Treaty of Maastricht also reinforced this point from the beginning of the text, recognizing as objective a closer union of the people of Europe, and to establish the decision-making as near as possible to the citizens. Therefore it would not leave the structures equally with an expansion of actors in European policy, including not only regional actors but also private spheres, which have been integrated in the complex system of transnational decision-making within Europe. They have learned how to defend and represent directly their interests in the wider framework of European policy system. An interesting mechanism to know how successful is the role of regional actors in the development and the implementation of the Structural policy. The Spanish case corresponds to decentralize systems like German or Belgian ones. European integration process brings a new model where the territorial sovereignty is questioned; the

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The Westphalian state model is no more practice within a globalized world. Some authors describe this process as the “sandwich model”, composed by the combination of a strength EU and strength regions that gives as result a thin national state. The reality of European Union seems to push for the transformation of national states, within a federal multilevel structure. National states are facing on one hand the loss of territorial sovereignty, and on the other hand the revaluation of regional in European level (not only as lower actors). In the study case of this paper, Spanish national state faces not only the empowerment of regional actors in European level but also within its barriers. Regional policy mobilizes the regions and it is central to the emergence of multi-level governance in which supranational, national, regional, and local governments, are enmeshed a territorially overarching policy networks. The supporters of this point of view understand EU as a “consisting overlapping competencies among multiple levels of governments and the interaction of political actors across those levels”, eradicating the traditional distinction between domestic and international politics.

In other words, there is a friction between the “functional space” and “territorial space”; the long existing territorial ties are now being replaced by newly functional bonds that liberate the social, political or economical activity from territorial boundaries. At this point as Rob Schobben describes, there is a “widening of the concept of government to that of governance”. Governance captures the interaction between public authorities and non-governmental or functional actors, allowing the replacement of typical territorial governmental bodies by more open, flexible interrelationships between public/private, territorial/functional and state/market. Jachefuchts argue about governance that “such a new form of political organisation must be located somewhere in the middle of an imagined continuum between horizontal (market, international system) and vertical (hierarchical state) organisation”.

But at the same time the regional policy of EU seems to strengthen the role of national governments within policy-making, as Börzel or Milward defend. The redistribution of new sources derived from Brussels is the major driving forces of institutional changes, and with this

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transferring of policy competencies in the European level, national governments can increase their control over policy outcomes as the gate-keep or monopolize the access to European policy-making. This division of opinions and theories reflect the difficulty to establish a unique model that explains the effects of European integration on national states and regional level, but what it is clear is that the influence exists and provokes institutional change. Each state presents peculiarities and an institutional system that explains the different answers to Europeanization and to the level of decentralization that they have now. Is the moment to observe it in the Spanish case, the main cause of this paper.

3.1 Historical Development of the participation of Autonomous Communities in European Affairs

The weak territorial framework and institutions has made the process of Europeanization more difficult. In the last twenty years the Autonomous communities has moved themselves from an initial competitive adaptional strategy, in which each region wanted to preserve each competencies against the central-state or even increase more than the other autonomous communities (especially Basque Country and Catalonia); to more cooperative positions as for example the Interministerial Conference on European Affairs of 1988 or the recent new framework created in the CARCE\textsuperscript{32} on the year 2004.

The Spanish constitution, so the legal framework, allows for the transfer of both national and regional competencies to the European level\textsuperscript{33} without requiring the consent of the Autonomous Communities, which obviously did not have any co-determination powers to lose when national competencies were transferred to the European level, because they did not participate in national decision-making. This is the first friction point between central-state and regional powers. The autonomous communities at the beginning of Europeanization process were not concerned about their loose of competences in important fields like fisheries, agriculture or industry. Even they felt that central state was using this transfer power and the implementation of Community Law to regain competencies already devolved to Autonomous communities\textsuperscript{34}. This is the other reason of the competitive situation between central administration and regional governments during the 80’s and beginning the 90’s.

\textsuperscript{32} CARCE: Conferencia de asuntos relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas (Conference to affairs related with the european communities.


The huge implementation burden required by the then called European Community, on the year of Spanish membership (1986), opened the eyes of central-state and it needs of intergovernmental cooperation to coordinate their resources in the implementation process, but trying to keep the whole sovereignty in international matters and responsibility in European affairs. The autonomous communities by its way also have understood the need of cooperation, but always claiming and trying to redress the territorial balance of power. Therefore its intentions have been a direct contact with European institutions, especially in the cases of Catalonia and Basque Country, and to break the central-state monopoly in European policy-making by pushing for cooperation with the Spanish government in decision-making as well as the implementation of European policies.

3.1.1 Project of agreement of 1985

The first attempt to find intergovernmental coordination central-regions in European policy-making came shortly before the Spain’s accession to the EC, in 1985. The central administration’s proposal wanted to regulate the participation of the Spanish regions in the implementation of European legal acts and the decision-making.

In relation with implementation stage the Spanish government proposed the distribution of responsibilities, where the central state transpose European policies while the Autonomous Communities would put them into practice. The Autonomies would not have direct contact with the European institutions. In the decision-making level the 1985 agreement is not so specific. The Spanish government would consider the concerns of the Autonomous communities in the formulation of its bargaining position. It also decided if a EU proposal affect autonomous competencies and interests, in this case it would inform the regional government. Therefore foresaw the possibility of using the “Sectorial Conferences” (first was made in 1983) to help the development of a common criteria for the implementation of European policies and as a way to to avoid contradicting implementations norms at regional level.

The answer of autonomous communities was negative; they rejected the agreement basically because they understood it as an attempt of central government to control or to act as gate-keep their access to European. Especially strong was the opposition of three of the fourth “historical communities”: Catalonia, Galicia and Basque Country. Their major claims were the facts that central government would decide which information could concern regional affairs, the position of the Autonomous Communities would not be binding for the Spanish government and they would not be allowed to maintain direct official contacts with European Institutions or even state-
mediated access to European decision-making bodies because it was not foreseen in the agreement the participation of their representatives in the Spanish delegation. 

3.1.2 Second proposal of Spanish government: 1986

After the rejection, by not only Spanish government but also by the others communities’ powers, of a proposal of Catalan government from the same year, the Spanish central-administration in April prepared a second project that took some considerations of the first failed proposal. Referring to the question of implementation of European legal acts, it proposed to be regulated according to the distribution of responsibilities in domestic policy-making. Which actually meant that central-state and autonomous communities would mutually inform each other of what action each was taking.

On the decision-making stage Spanish government proposed to provide the regional governments with all European documents and information related to their competencies and interests. The autonomous communities was allowed to formulate opinions and transmit them to the Spanish Ministry for Territorial Administrations.

Maybe the most interesting point in this second proposal was the idea of an interautonomous coordination body. This body would be responsible of exchange information, the formulation of joint position of the autonomous communities and even the coordination of central state and the autonomous communities. This body also would nominate an observer (Observador de las Comunidades Autónomas) who would be member of the Spanish permanent Representation in Brussels, as a member of Spanish delegation it could participate in the working committees of the European decision-making bodies.

This proposal denied any kind of representation of autonomous communities in the COREPER or the Council of Ministers. The general elections in 1986 prevented the formal submission of this project to the regional governments.

3.1.3 Third proposal: 1987

This draft adopted the same conditions referred to implementations of European policies as in 1986 project, but changed the participation of autonomous communities in the decision-making level. Dropping the idea of a interautonomous coordinator, the Sectorial Conferences were seen as a possible forum, but also left an opened door to new intergovernmental coordination mechanism. The Ministry of public Administrations would be responsible of having the

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Autonomous governments informed about European issues. This left also the option to Autonomous Communities to voice their opinions in this ministry. The role of the Autonomous observer was strengthened, because as a member of Spanish delegation, observer would be allowed to participate not only in the decision making bodies (Commission and Council) but also in the meeting of the council of Minister and the COREPER. The stronger opposition to this draft came from catalan government, which expressed its reservation, but especially from Basque country, whose representatives showed their objection to the specific set-up of the Observer. These objections and other critics related with the access of autonomous communities to European information finished with the third project of intergovernmental cooperation in European affairs\(^{37}\).

The reasons of this continue rejection of Spanish central-state drafts are in the basis of the Spanish regional system. The differences created with the Spanish constitution, distinguishing different types of regions and competences made impossible to find a unique position vis-à-vis the national state. Once more the asymmetrical nature of the Spanish state appeared as a confrontation argument. In this sense the autonomous communities far from reaching common positions, relied on bilateral and informal contact with the central government to be informed about over European issues and even to confront the possible intrusion of Spanish central state in its own competencies. At the end of the 80´s the CCAA came to realize that their strategy of “circumventing and confronting the state” in European policy-making had little effect in opposing the centralization of their competencies.

3.1.4 First steps of intergovernmental agreements.

Assuming the failure of the attempts of a general agreement on the participation of Autonomies in European policy-making, the central state took a more pragmatic tactic: settling specific issues by partial agreements that would create an institutionalized dialogue. Therefore on December 1988 was created the Interministerial Conference on European Affairs (Conferencia de Asuntos relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas). In its second session one year after it was established the three basic principles:

1. the exclusive competence for foreign relations belongs to central state
2. the Spanish accession to EC must not affect the internal distribution of competencies

3. central state exercise their competencies following the legal framework of the Spanish Constitution

The first years this Conference focused on specific issues from the implementation of European policies. The first two intergovernmental agreements between autonomous communities and central-administration were signed one year after, on 1990. The first referred to the implementation of community law, while the second ones the regulation of the obligatory announcement (by the state) of the public subsidies to the commission.

In order to ensure the conference, a second order body was created under the name Commission of Coordinators in European Affairs (Comisión de Coordinadores de Asuntos Comunitarios Europeos), whose role is basically the preparation of conference’s meetings and the implementation of its decisions. This body was responsible of the preparation of the joint proposal of the Autonomous Communities for the Committee of the Regions to be included in the Maastricht Treaty, and also framed the 1992 Agreement on the Institutionalization of the Conference.

3.1.5 Autonomous Treaties of 1992

The Autonomy Agreements of 28th February 1992 advanced the open-ended process of devolution, seeking to harmonize the level of decentralization between the regions, and establish intergovernmental cooperation between central and regional authorities. This proposition of Spanish government became after the relative success of its pragmatic approach achieved by the intergovernmental conferences, had as major task being the instrument of general participation of the Autonomous Communities in European policy-making on the basis of intergovernmental cooperation. The agreement is specific in various tasks of the Conference for European affairs, including the information of the autonomous communities on the session of the European Council. But also includes solutions to problems like technical procedures, normative techniques for incorporating European Directives, participation of the autonomous communities in domestic procedures and of course “the implementation of Community law that affects several policy areas and that requires horizontal coordination”.

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38 op.cit. P.121
39 op.cit. P.122.
40 Bache, Ian, and Jones, Rachel: Has EU regional policy empowered the regions? London, Autumn 2000. p. 4
Autonomous communities started to understand the cooperation with the central-administration not as a centralization threat, but as an interesting possibility for obtaining information, money and political influence, which they did not have before.

In exception of the Basque Country, the rest of Autonomous Communities accepted the signature of this treaty. Basque country administration was still claiming for bilateral relations with central state for dealing with European issues, and for the institutionalization of a Commission of the Basque Country and the State on European Affairs. This kind of reclamations included even the establishment of a “Basque Embassy” in Brussels, which clearly was not legal within the Spanish constitutional framework, and what would supposed a privilege in comparison with the others autonomous communities.

3.1.6 Agreement on procedural framework on 1994

The year 1994 is an important year in decentralization process in Spain. In national policy there debate about the participation of autonomous communities in central state and in the Senate especially. In order to advance in this question in January was created the “General Commission of the Autonomous Communities” in the Senate, in which the presidents of autonomous communities could participate in the sessions with voice but without voice. The necessity to reform the upper house war even more clearly seen related with the need of fulfilment of Maastricht Treaty’s requirements (1992). In European matters, the Conference on European Affairs after its institutionalization needed the elaboration of a legal framework that included the participation of sub-national level in European policy-making. This legal framework was created also in 1994, and had to be implemented in each of the 18 sectorial conferences included in the agreement. The main task of the Conference is:

«...establecer el contenido necesario de la participación de las Comunidades Autónomas en los asuntos comunitarios europeos a través de las Conferencias Sectoriales, determinando el procedimiento marco de cooperación que cada Conferencia Sectorial debe aplicar tanto en lo que respecta a la fase ascendente, de formación de la voluntad del Estado en el seno de la Unión Europea, como en la descendente de aplicación del Derecho comunitario europeo y de los actos de las instituciones.»

42 López Guerra, Luis: Regions and Nationalitites in Spain: The Autonomous Communities. P.155
The information question about European issues, role played by the Sectorial conferences, was still based on the mutual exchange of documents between central-state administration and the autonomous governments. They are necessary for an correct and effective participation of Spanish autonomies in the EU-policy-making. The Spanish government briefs the Autonomous through the Conference on European Affairs on the meetings of the European Council and the agenda of the incoming Presidency of the Council. The Sectorial Conferences are responsible for transmitting Commission proposals to the autonomies.

In decision-making level on European policies, the autonomous communities may formulate joint positions on specific issues and coordinate them with central-state administration. In case that exclusive legislative competency of the Autonomous communities is affected, the regional governments have the right to formulate a joint position that determines the Spanish bargaining position. When the EU proposal only the competencies of the central state affects, the autonomous communities can be informed but without binding statements. If shared or concurrent competencies are involved or if EU decision affects public spending, the common position of central-state and autonomies determine the Spanish bargaining position in the Council of Ministers.

The implementation of EU policies also contains the information exchange from central state to autonomous communities about the legal and administrative measures taken in the transposition and practical application. Central administration provides the sectorial conferences a set of drafts relating to the legal incorporation of European policies in the Spanish law. The central state also informs the autonomous communities about the development and implementation of community programs, like European Funds for example.

In a first moment the Basque Country, like in 1992, rejected the option to sign this agreement demanding the right to direct participation in European policy-making and for the establishment of a Bilateral Commission, creating an interautonomous body which would exclude the central-state. Spanish government reacted establishing a Bilateral Commission on European Affair with the Basque Country. Not only Basque Country, but also Catalonia defended the idea of a “Europe of the Regions”, and wanted the direct presence of them in the policy-making process at European level. The Maastricht Treaty, but especially the creation of the Committee of the Regions on 1994, brought new opportunities to regional powers and even central-state.

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The Basque bilateral tactic about European issues with Spanish central state changed subsequently and admitted the agreement that the other Spanish autonomies signed. At the same time the Basque representatives, like the Catalan ones, took an active position within the recent created Committee of the Regions.

Finally a comprehensive agreement that provided intrastate participation of the Autonomous Communities in the decision making and implementation of the EU policies was reached. It represents the first time that Spanish central-state shares its decision making powers with the Autonomous Communities. The agreement of 1994 assures the regions that internal distribution of if competencies in implementation would not be changed by Europeanization, but also allows sharing of implementation costs by pooling information. This formal intergovernmental agreement correspondent to multilateral intergovernmental cooperation is the result of a change in the strategy of the Autonomous Communities facing the process of Europeanization.

In the same year the Constitutional Court pronounced a sentence that recognised the right of Basque Country to open representation offices in Brussels. This new opportunity has been taken by all the autonomous communities, which have opened offices in Brussels during the last decade.

Following the good atmosphere of the Agreements of 1994, three years later, in 1996 within the coalition government with Catalan party, the Conference on European Affairs agreed to establish a Consejero de Asuntos Autonómicos (concelor for Autonomous Affairs), inspired in the German Länderbeobachter. The conselor is included in the Spanish Permanent Representation in Brussels, what offers the possibility to participate in European decision-making bodies as a member of the Spanish delegation whenever an issue affects the competencies of an Autonomous Community. The reality shows that the autonomous observer has a limited role because of the “prevailing reluctance of the central state to allow direct participation of regional representatives”. The figure of the Counselor for Autonomous affairs was adopted by all the Autonomous Communities through the signature of the Agreement of 1997. It is the first time that all the Autonomous government signed by all, including the Basque Country.


In the last years we can differentiate two phases in the Spanish policy about the implication of autonomous communities in European policy. While in the last years of the 90’s the central government was dependent of electoral coalitions with nationalist parties from Cataluña and Basque Country, during the last phase of the conservative Government (Partido Popular with José María Anar as leader) had absolute majority. It meant that following its idea of nation-state as unique responsible of exterior representant, the possible participation of Autonomous Communities on the Council of Ministries of European Union was rejected. Its legal example is the Project of “Ley de Cooperación Autonómica” presented on Februar 2002. The answers from regional forces came through a project of law voted in the Catalan parliament to ensure the representation of Autonomous Communities in the EU, and also to lead the negotiations when the matters were related with its interest or competencies. The Basque government presented by its way a plan to change its autonomous statute, beginning the actual phase of renovation of statutes, on October 2002 in which was included the direct representation of Basque Country in Europa and in the decision-making.

On March 2004 won the national elections the socialist party under the leadership of Jose Luis Rodriguez Zapatero (actual Spanish president). Since then the Spanish government has started a renovation of the decentralization process that has as two big examples the new autonomous statutes approved and the new legal framework of participation of the Autonomous Communities at the EU: Conferencia de Asuntos Relacionados con las Comunidades Europeas of December 2004. This agreement, signed by all the Spanish Autonomous Communities, has two fundamental points: the institutionalisation of the representation of the Autonomous Communities in the Spanish Representation, and secondly the general rules that will organise the participation of the Autonomies in the workings of the EU Council.

The figure of the Consejeros Autonómicos is strengthen, because is now a real representative of the Autonomous Communities within the Spanish Permanent Representation. In comparison with its situation before 2004 the consejero is designed as a representative of the autonomies and participate in the decision-making defending the interest of the regions, and it is also empowered to

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49 Ramon i Sumoy, Ricard: Multi-level governance in Spain: building new patterns of sub-national participation in the EU policy-making.
attend the Working Groups of the Council and the COREPER on behalf of the Autonomous Communities\textsuperscript{50}. That means a new phase in the cooperation between region and central-state, and “the autonomous counsellor become a real observer appointed by the Autonomous Community, and accountable to the Conference of European Affairs”\textsuperscript{51} (which is the main body of institutional cooperation).

The new agreement respects the principle of unity in external representation under Spanish central-state and defines which configurations of the Council are open to autonomous participation:

- Agriculture and Fisheries
- Environment
- Employment and Social Policy
- Health and Consumer Affairs and Education, Youth and Culture\textsuperscript{52}.

It also considers that other configurations affect regional powers like Transport or Energy but the autonomous communities do not have representation in them. It is interesting that it affects equally to all the communities, as the figure of Consejero Autonómico, represents all the autonomous and act under the supervision of the national minister. It reflects a two folder principle: symmetrical one among all the autonomies as a basis of this agreement and it is based on the multilateral cooperation principle within the Conferencias Sectoriales framework. Each community choose their representative and will define its policy in each council of Ministers. It continues with the intergovernmental relation based on sectorial cooperation between each national minister and the regional ministers responsible.

The influence of regional actors not only has been increased in definition of the policy, but also in information stage. The Spanish regions have now full access to all the stages of the Council. In the Working Groups with the presence of one autonomous representative in the meetings; COREPER with the role played by the Autonomous counsellor, and finally at the Council of Ministers with the attendance of the regional Minister\textsuperscript{53}.


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Referring to decision-making, the new agreement reflect the reality of internal policy: diversity among the autonomies. The main obstacle to influence the national position at European level appears in cases of opposing preferences. In case of individual interest the non-affected support the demands of the concerned autonomous communities. And this is the positive balance of the Sectorial Conferences system, which has deepen the interaction between autonomous communities, the national state and even other decision-making institutions.

**CONCLUSIONS**

Spain finds itself in the middle of two process related with its institutional framework: decentralization and Europeanization. Both are related and are acting parallel in the Spanish recent history, causing most of the time problems of intrusion and conflict between central-state and regional governments.

In the last years also European Union is facing one of its most important questions of the integration process, the problem of democracy as the rejection results in the constitutional referendum in France or Netherlands reflected.

The answer of both problems seems to be more participation and proximity to the citizen, making feel them active part of the decisions taken. Regional policy of European Union is increasing its importance within European policies, reflecting the central role that sub-national levels are reaching. The development of intergovernmental relations between Spanish central-state and autonomous communities are a clear example of the needed transformation that the member states are facing in order to implement Brussels’ directives and to represent the interests of the all state at European level. The example of the typical Spanish intergovernmental cooperation, represented by the *Conferencias Sectoriales*, shows how the policy in Europe is establishing a multi-level governance system, where the traditional political barriers and actors are being exceeded by new sub-nationals and even private forces. It is a fact that it is no more possible continues with the same institutional system in Spain to face the challenges of Europeanization. This was the first intention of this paper, understand the evolution and changes suffered by the Spanish institutional model. The system of participation of the Autonomous Communities in the Council of Ministers reinforces sub-national self-government and, curiously, at the same time strengthens internal cohesion within the state. The Spanish regions has won competencies and
even direct defence of interests in some cases, but the Spanish central-administration has been reinforced and also the multilevel cooperative system that characterized Spain.

The second point, and more important, was to observe how the Europeanization have directly affected this evolution. Through the description of the historical process in the relations central-state/regions in European Affairs, I have understood that the increasing importance of European governance is not only the internal structures, but also how power is exercised. In this sense the direct influence of European integration process over Spanish institutional system could be seen on 1988 after the reforms of Structural Funds in European Community was followed at Spanish soil with the creation of the Interministerial Conference on European Affairs. The importance of European issues was increasing and not only central-state but also autonomous Communities wanted to defend their interests but also take all the opportunities that Europe could bring.

Another turning point was the Maastricht of Treaty of 1992, which reinforced the role that sub-national levels had to play in Europeanization. On 1992 also in Spain there were the inclusion of the “General Commission of the Autonomous Communities” in the Senate, and the assignment of the Agreement on procedural framework for the Conference of European Affairs, both in 1994.

One important point, and directly related with regional powers, was the creation of the Committee of the Regions, that opened a new via for Spanish autonomous communities. After the beginning of the CoR not only the role of the Spanish regions was taken in consideration, but also reinforced the sovereign role of central-state. The interdependency between the three different levels of governance (supra-national, national and sub-national) is being increased, and the leadership of the Spanish state in the conversations with Autonomous Communities also reinforced, which means the legitimacy of national state supported by regions at European level and also in national policy.

Nowadays the example of Spanish reality can be observed as an interesting field to understand how works Europeanization in pseudo-federal and asymmetrical states. In this sense it could also be an extrapolation of how could work the governance in European Union level. The role played by central-state is no questioned, nor in Spanish case, neither at European level. But in both is also clear the development of an intergovernmental cooperative system under the classic multi-level governance characteristics.
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