

Active and Cohesive
Tomorrow's EU Policy towards Belarus

Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw
Association for International Affairs, Prague
January 2006



STEFAN
**BATORY
FOUNDATION**



Active and Cohesive Tomorrow's EU Policy towards Belarus

Grzegorz Gromadzki
Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

Luboš Veselý
Association for International Affairs, Prague



Stefan Batory Foundation

Sapieżyńska 10a

00-215 Warsaw

tel. |48 22| 536 02 00

fax |48 22| 536 02 20

batory@batory.org.pl

www.batory.org.pl

Art director of the Stefan Batory Foundation's publications

Marta Kusztra

Cover design by

Teresa Oleszczuk

Typesetting by

TYRSA Sp. z o.o.

© Copyright by the Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw

ISBN 83-89406-57-8

ISBN 80-903468-2-0

Contents

Introduction	7
First Part – diagnosis	11
1. An assessment of the situation in Belarus	11
2. The Russian factor	19
3. US policy towards Belarus	21
4. EU policy towards Belarus	22
5. Last months’ developments	25
6. Predictions	26
Second Part – new strategy towards Belarus	29
1. A new philosophy of EU policy towards Belarus – principles	29
2. EU strategy towards Belarus – activities	32
3. Tools	39

Introduction

The question of Belarus has become one of the most important problems of EU policy towards its neighbours due to three fundamental circumstantial factors:

Firstly, the enlargement of the EU in 2004 has changed the position of Belarus in the EU perspective. From 2004, Belarus has bordered the EU. The border stretches more than 1000 km and three member countries (Latvia, Lithuania and Poland) are neighbours with Belarus. In this context, a lack of consistent EU strategy towards Belarus, both before and after the enlargement of 2004, becomes much more visible.

Secondly, the colour revolutions, especially the Orange Revolution in Ukraine, have changed the situation in post-Soviet space, including the space of Belarus. The democratization processes in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova impact both directly and indirectly the situation in Belarus. A section of Belarusian society is looking towards these three countries and is waiting to see what will happen. Their successful transformation would provide concrete proof that Belarus can also become a normal, European state.

Thirdly, last but not least, are the coming presidential elections in Belarus in March 2006. Belarus has been a self-isolated, authoritarian regime since 1996 and has remained outside the Council of Europe. But presidential elections in 2006 can create a crucial 'novelty' in the form of a third term of Lukashenko as president. This would be a unique example in Europe,

similar to dictatorships in post-soviet Central Asian countries, and is not acceptable for Europeans. It is self-evident that the EU cannot ignore those three challenges and should respond adequately.

However, the above-mentioned circumstances cannot explain all concerns for Belarus held by the EU. In addition, there are at least four other reasons why the EU (both European institutions and Member States) should be interested in the issue of Belarus:

The human rights' abuses carried out by the autocratic regime of Lukashenko constitute the first reason. Belarusian society has a right to democracy. The majority of Belarusians, especially the young generation, is against a third term for Lukashenko and Belarusian society is also for co-operation with the EU. The EU has to answer to Belarusian aspirations. This is a test of the credibility of the EU as a provider of democracy in Europe.

The question of the EU's soft security forms the second reason for EU interest in Belarus. An undemocratic country like Belarus is not a credible partner for co-operation in the JHA (for example, the fight against organised crime, and the trafficking in human beings) and in ecology. Belarus under the Lukashenko regime cannot develop any cross-border co-operation, which helps build security between the EU and its neighbours. There is an increasingly visible gap between the positive development of cross-border co-operation between, on the one hand, EU Member States like Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine and, on the other, Member States (for example, Lithuania and Poland) and Belarus.

Thirdly, the unclear relations between the Lukashenko regime and countries such as Iran could present a threat to the security of the EU. The Belarusian authorities seek contacts with autocratic regimes across the world. The Lukashenko regime also co-operates with them on security/military issues and the sale of weapons and military equipment to rogue states and other autocratic regimes.

Fourthly, Belarus is a challenge to EU-Russia relations. The ruling Russian political elite looks at EU policy towards Belarus as an example of policy towards non-democratic regimes. This is important to the elite due to the problems to take place in 2008 (the next presidential elections in Russia) and the increasingly visible lack of democracy in Russia. For the Russian elite, the presidential elections in Belarus in March 2006 will also be a test of EU determination in its policy towards autocratic regimes. Ambiguous EU policy towards Lukashenko could be a signal for the ruling elite in Moscow that the EU is unable to make consistent policy. A lack of determination towards Lukashenko would demonstrate a lack of objection to the deterioration of the situation in Russia in next few years.

It should be underlined that the development of the situation in Belarus is unpredictable. Whilst on the one hand, Lukashenko can continue to be president for many years, political changes may also take place in the next few years or even in the next few months. The success of the congress of opposition forces in October 2005 and the choice of a common opposition candidate can be seen as a signal of the opposition's rejuvenation. Therefore, the EU should be prepared for several scenarios and rethink its policy towards Belarus in the next few months.

This paper is divided into two parts. The first part is not a comprehensive description of different aspects of the situation in and around Belarus, but rather an indispensable diagnosis for how best to build EU strategy towards Belarus, and includes four key elements: the internal situation in Belarus, the Russia factor, US policy towards Belarus and EU policy towards Belarus. The second part of the paper, concentrating on EU strategy towards Belarus, is focused on three aspects of future EU policy towards Belarus: a new philosophy, activities and tools needed for the implementation of EU activities.

It should be added that several papers on EU–Belarus relations have appeared in recent months. The Pontis Foundation in Slovakia presented a policy brief in March 2005, the Association of International Affairs in Prague and the Stefan Batory Foundation in Warsaw published a policy brief in April 2005, the Chaillot paper concerning Belarus, prepared by the Institute for Security Studies in Paris, also appeared in November 2005, and the Centre for European Reform in London devoted an article to EU–Belarus relations in December 2005¹. These articles are evidence of the growing importance of the Belarusian issue in 2006.

¹ *EU Democracy Assistance to Belarus: How to Make Small Improvements Larger and More Systematic?*, Pontis Foundation/Institute for Civic Diplomacy, March 24, 2005, <http://www.nadaciapontis.sk/en/11030>; Grzegorz Gromadzki, Vitali Silitski, Lubos Vesely, *Effective Policy towards Belarus – A Challenge for the enlarged EU*, Stefan Batory Foundation, Warsaw & Association for International Affairs, Prague, April 2005, <http://www.batory.org.pl/english/intl/pub.htm#belarus>; *Changing Belarus*, edited by Dov Lynch, Chaillot Paper 85, The European Union Institute for Security Studies, November 2005, <http://www.iss-eu.org/chaillot/chai85e.html>; Urban Ahlin, *The EU Needs a Policy on Belarus*, CER Bulletin, issue 45, December 2005 / January 2006, http://www.cer.org.uk/articles/45_ahlin.html.

First Part – diagnosis

1. An assessment of the situation in Belarus

1.1. The Lukashenko regime – general observations

The autocratic regime of Lukashenko is an exception in Europe. The Belarusian president has ruled in an anti-democratic manner since the constitutional referendum in 1996, which significantly extended presidential competences and ended a short period of fragile Belarusian democracy which appeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. There are many symptoms of the autocratic regime in Belarus: seven can be viewed as the most important:

Firstly, the opposition forces were evicted from the official political system after the constitutional referendum in 1996. Since that time, they have not been given opportunity to explain their position in any parliament or in other state bodies. They are deprived of access to state TV and radio; as a result, normal contact with society is impossible.

Secondly, since the beginning of its rule, Lukashenko's regime has constantly attempted to destroy the nascent civil society. Many laws have been created as oppressive tools against NGOs. Civil society has also been oppressed by administrative regulations or simply illegal methods which break

even Belarusian anti-democracy laws. Measures against civil society show that Lukashenko's regime fears organised independent groups and initiatives and prefers to deal with amorphous atomised soviet-style society.

Thirdly, one of the main goals of the Lukashenko regime has been the destruction of national identity that otherwise could have acted as a mobilising factor in democratisation. The Belarusian authorities have fought against the Belarusian language, for example, closing schools which teach it. They reintroduced a Soviet version of Belarus' history. Therefore, for Belarus, the building of national identity does not mean a victory for nationalism; rather, it means the self-identification of the population as presently many of them still remain *homo sovieticus*.

The fourth symptom can be seen in the attempts made by Belarusian authorities to control business and thus combat privatisation. The private sector of the economy is still very weak. Just as in the case of civil society, Lukashenko's regime has used the legal system and illegal methods as tools against both state-owned and private business circles. It shows that the judicial system completely depends on the president himself and the presidential administration.

In the fifth symptom, the regime controls all electronic media in Belarus. This is crucial because TV and radio are the main sources of information for Belarusian society. Official propaganda is similar to the propaganda from the Soviet time: independent newspapers and magazines are oppressed and their circulation is small in comparison with regime media.

The sixth symptom is that official propaganda presents Lukashenko as father of the nation who is a guarantor of stability. He is irreplaceable according to the propaganda. It is in this light that we must view the possibility of an endless presidency by Lukashenko due to the referendum of 2004.

The seventh and final symptom is that the regime wants to consolidate the Belarusian society through the generation of opinion that Belarus is in danger due to external plots. Lukashenko and his collaborators, therefore, look for external enemies. Just as in Soviet times, the main enemy is the USA and NATO plus its allies, Lithuania and Poland, the West as a whole and the EU, especially after the enlargement of 2004. Thus, rouge states like Iran become natural allies as the opponents of the USA or the West.

1.2. The economic situation

Belarus has experienced significant economic growth in recent years. In 2004, growth was high at 11 per cent; in 2005, it was lower – about 8 per cent. One of the main reasons for economic growth has been the low prices of crude oil and gas imported from Russia. Inflation is relatively low: 11 per cent in April 2005. Paradoxically, economic growth appeared despite a lack of market reforms. The Belarusian economy is highly centralised and controlled by the state; the private sector creates only about 25 per cent of GDP. According to IMF predictions, sustainable growth in future years is not possible without wide-ranging structural reforms.

Russia remains the main economic partner for the Lukashenko regime. First of all, Belarus depends on energy supplies from Russia (natural gas and crude oil). But Belarusian exports to the EU have also emerged as significant in the last two years. In 2004, the EU accounted for more than 37 per cent of Belarusian exports (Russia for 47 per cent), but in 2005 exports to the EU increased whilst exports to Russia decreased. This change was accomplished due to a serious growth of oil products' export from Belarus to the EU, in particular the Netherlands.

It is a paradox that Belarus, which does not own any oil reserves, has profited from the oil boom of the last two years. This situation is possible because Russia sells crude oil to Belarus at reduced prices (less than 60 per cent of average world prices) and Belarus sells the oil products in the EU at world prices. The income is therefore enormous. It can be said that both

Russia and the EU support, albeit indirectly, the Lukashenko regime as the enormous income resulting from the export of oil products is also used to rescue the Belarusian budget.

1.3. Society

The last century was extremely difficult for Belarusian society. The memory of the Second World War, Soviet terror and famine still shape the common consciousness of the Belarusian people. Therefore, the 'stability' offered by the Lukashenko regime is more important to many than the possibilities of democracy; the population accepts a low standard of living in exchange for a lack of 'wars and famine'. Moreover, there have been small but visible improvements in the standard of living due to the oil boom. In summary, therefore, Lukashenko appears to a section of Belarusian society, in particular the older generation, as a good manager.

The atomization of society, a heritage of the Soviet era preserved by the Lukashenko regime, is still one of the most important factors in the social life of Belarus. Such a situation provokes apathy as many Belarusians feel helpless against the Lukashenko regime. It should be noted that about 80 per cent of Belarusians depend directly on the state for employment, salaries, pensions and so on.

There are visible differences between generations in their approach to Lukashenko and his regime. Despite the younger generation being generally more against Lukashenko, conformism amongst this group is also widespread as many of them try to find their place in the realities of today's Belarus. The older generation is more friendly towards Lukashenko.

Although the national movement is limited, support for independence is strong in Belarusian society. It should be noted that Belarusian society is not a part of Russian society. Unlike Russia, Belarus does not consider itself a unique society in an imperial sense. For example, Belarusians do not support the war in Chechnya. In his propaganda, Lukashenko has frequently used the fact that young Belarusians, contrary to Russians, did not have to

take part in the Chechen war as soldiers. This argument provoked positive reactions among Belarusians.

Any such evaluation of Belarusian society does not mean that Belarusians are against Russia. On the contrary, Belarusians feel a kind of proximity to Russia, they support close relations with Russians and more than half are in favour of Belarus' close co-operation with Russia. However, this does not mean that they support the inclusion of Belarus as part of Russia.

On the other hand, about 50 per cent of Belarusians support the future European integration of Belarus. The EU is perceived as a 'better world' due to European values and standards of living. It should be underlined that pro-European behaviour by a significant part of Belarusian society has become a reality despite strong anti-European (anti-Western) propaganda by the Lukashenko regime.

The results of sociological research show that there are three distinct groups within Belarusian society: the first supports integration with Russia, the second supports integration with the EU and the third, also significant, supports integration in both directions. This situation is similar to Ukraine.

1.4. Business circles

There is a visible lack of large business groups inside the country and strong regional business groups do not exist. This situation emphasises a major difference between Belarus and Ukraine, where regional and/or big business groups do exist. Big and medium-size private businesses (relative to Belarusian reality) are strictly controlled by the Lukashenko regime. These businesses cannot work without a very close and individual level of co-operation with the authorities.

Lukashenko has become the single oligarch in the country due to his control over, both directly and through collaborators, state and private enterprises, in particular profitable ones.

In such circumstances, the emergence of a 'middle class' movement (the movement of street vendors) deserves attention. In February and March

2005, about 80,000 street vendors refused to pay VAT on goods imported from Russia. Thousands organised protests against new VAT levels. In addition, when 3000 people gathered in front of the government building in Minsk with a petition signed by 30,000 street vendors, the Belarusian police did not intervene. The protests of street vendors were strictly focused on the fight for their own interests. They attempt to adapt to the rules presented by the regime and are uninterested in co-operation with the political opposition as such co-operation could threaten their relationship with the authorities. Nevertheless, some representatives of that movement participated in the congress of opposition forces in October 2005.

1.5. Opposition forces

All activities not controlled by authorities are classified as anti-state activities by the Lukashenko regime. This means that not only political parties and their activists but also NGOs are in principle perceived by the Lukashenko regime as opposition forces.

NGOs

There are about 3000 non-governmental organisations in Belarus. Part of them (approximately 500) have started to work illegally because of administrative persecution. The number of illegal (non-registered) NGOs has increased significantly and almost no banned NGOs have ceased to work.

The spectrum of their activities is very broad. The majority are focused on the broad field of social activity – for example education, youth and children, the disabled and the handicapped and gender issues. A significant part are engaged in the building of civil society in Belarus. Many NGOs are interested in arts and culture, and environmental issues are also present in NGO activities. The majority of NGOs are active in Minsk and the Minsk region.

The influence of NGOs in Belarusian society is limited. However, they have significant potential and have developed to a surprising extent despite worsening working conditions. It should be underlined that the social, political and even economic situation of Belarusian society would be significantly

worse without the existence of the so-called third sector. NGO activists make up the most active group within Belarus society.

NGOs sometimes have personal links with the political opposition because many politicians also work as NGO activists. Therefore, some NGOs are directly involved in politics. However, NGOs as a whole cannot (and do not wish to) play a leading role in politics. Nevertheless, they can be a useful and even indispensable force in the political process focusing on the democratisation of Belarus as they play a leading role in the fight against the Lukashenko regime. The majority of participants at the congress of opposition forces in October 2005 derived from NGOs.

The existence of the third sector depends almost entirely on external support because internal resources are weak. This situation creates ambiguous relations between the Belarusian third sector and international donors. Weak Belarusian private business supports NGOs on a minimal scale, not only because of a lack of resources and tradition but primarily due to the objection of the Lukashenko regime.

Belarusian authorities create and support so-called GONGOs (Governmental Non-Governmental Organizations) which by definition entirely depend on the Lukashenko regime. Through this network of GONGOs, the Belarusian authorities attempt to control authentic NGOs and the activities of citizens.

The political opposition

The political opposition is working under the extremely complicated circumstances described above. The comparison between Ukraine before the Orange Revolution and Belarus today, as outlined below, illustrates the major differences for the Belarusian opposition. There are three profound differences between the situation of the Ukrainian and Belarusian opposition:

Firstly, the Belarusian opposition was evicted from the official political system in 1996 and does not have any representation in parliament. The

Ukrainian opposition was all along part of the official political system with opposition politicians as members of parliament.

In the case of Belarus, the political opposition holds a strange position between legal and clandestine activity. Whilst on the one hand opposition politicians are forced to act illegally due to non-democratic rules introduced against them by the regime, on the other hand they want to participate in the legal process of presidential elections organised by the Lukashenko regime in 2006. This creates a dubious situation in which Lukashenko's opponents must answer the dilemma as to whether to reject the autocratic rules of the Lukashenko regime and act against it or whether to accept the rules and take part in the game conducted by the Belarusian president. Unfortunately, there is not presently a good answer to this dilemma.

Secondly, the weakness of the opposition forces is visible. They cannot communicate normally with society due to their total absence from Belarusian TV and radio and business circles do not support the opposition. The Ukrainian situation before the Orange Revolution was different as although the opposition was also denied access to state TV and radio, private channels did exist and some of them more or less openly supported Viktor Yushchenko. Furthermore, some private Ukrainian businesses supported his 'Our Ukraine' party. In contrast, the Belarusian opposition depends primarily on external support.

Thirdly, the Ukrainian opposition has had a strong leader who is well-known in society. Yushchenko was one of the most popular politicians in Ukraine before the Orange Revolution. Many Belarusian would like to support the opposition candidate but they do not know his name, in spite of recent opinion polls in which it was stated that 20 per cent of the population are ready to vote for Alyaksandr Milinkevich.

The pessimistic realities, in comparison with Ukraine, provoke distrust among the Belarusian opposition. Many activists do not believe that the

opposition can win the presidential elections in March 2006 or even receive good results. Some of them think that the opposition should focus on the elections in 2011.

The evident success of the democratic congress held in October 2005 has managed to change these feelings, even if only slightly. More than 800 delegates from about 200 NGOs and political parties took part in the event in Minsk. About 7000 people participated as delegates in regional meetings before the congress. At the congress, Alyksandr Milinkevich was elected the single candidate for the opposition forces for the presidential elections in 2006. He is an NGO and local government activist and does not derive from Soviet bureaucracy. During the Soviet era, he was a university professor in physics. All contenders who participated in the choice of the single candidate are obliged to work for Milinkevich following the congress. They are the most important figures of his electoral campaign and it means that the main opposition forces are now united, although nobody can guarantee that the situation will not change in future.

Beside the mainstream opposition forces, there are several politicians who would also like to play the role of a democratic candidate. Part of them can be created or manipulated by the Lukashenko regime or Russia and have no background in civil society and society as a whole.

2. The Russian factor

Vladimir Putin supports Lukashenko despite quarrels between them. The most visible sign of this support was the official Russian acceptance of the referendum results in 2004, which allowed the endless presidential term for Lukashenko and low prices of natural gas and crude oil exported by Russia to Belarus. Gazprom, controlled by the Russian state, will sell Belarus 1000 cubic metres of gas for 47 USD in 2006. At the same time, the Russian company has demanded more than 200 USD for 1000 cubic metres from Ukraine.

So why does Putin support Lukashenko? Primarily, it seems that the main reason for his support is that Putin wishes to maintain 'stability' in Belarus out of fear of another 'colour revolution'. Nikolai Patrushev, the head of the Federal Security Service (FSB), said in May 2005 that foreign countries are using NGOs to support changes in the power structures of former Soviet republics and those responsible for organizing the Orange Revolution in Ukraine are now preparing a similar revolt in Belarus. A 'colour revolution' denotes democratisation. For Russian authorities, democratisation means losing influence, as a country in the process of a 'colour revolution's' is demonstrating its preference for the West over Russia. Therefore, the Kremlin favours Lukashenko and the Uzbek President, Islam Karimov rather than Victor Yushchenko or the Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili.

Secondly, the Russian political elite needs a success story in post-Soviet space. From their point of view, they have lost in Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova in the last few years. They cannot fully control even the small unrecognised republic of Abkhazia (a part of Georgia) which is economically totally dependent on Russia. Therefore, for Russia, Belarus represents the last bastion of Russian influence in the European section of post-Soviet space and therefore Minsk must be held on to tightly. Such thinking seems to be widespread in the Russian authorities under President Putin.

The third reason for Putin's support of Lukashenko is linked to the issue of the union between Russia and Belarus. The idea was developed in 90s during Boris Yeltsin's presidency. The issue is important for current Russian authorities not only from a psychological point of view. It also has a very practical dimension which will become highly important in 2008, at the end of Putin's second term. The open question of the union between Russia and Belarus can help Putin and his team to resolve problems of 2008 and thus provide the Russian president with a new post as leader of the union.

Putin's support for Lukashenko shows that democracy cannot be brought to Belarus via Russia or even with help of Russia. The Kremlin is only interested in maintaining the status quo in Belarus. It should be noted that the Russian opposition (Yabloko, the Union of Rightist Forces – United Democratic) supports the Belarusian democratic opposition, but unfortunately their influence is very weak in today's Russia.

3. US policy towards Belarus

US authorities present a clear position against the Lukashenko regime. Belarus is frequently described as the last European dictatorship. U.S. State Secretary Condoleezza Rice said in April 2005 in Vilnius that the Belarusian government should know that their behaviour is being watched by the international community, that Belarus is not a dark corner in which things can go on unobserved and uncommented upon, as if Belarus were not a part of the European continent.

In 2004, the US House of Representatives and the Senate voted for the Belarus Democracy Act, signed by president George W. Bush. The Act condemns antidemocratic behaviour of the Belarusian regime and proposes measures to support Belarusian civil society, and additionally act against the regime, for example, through sanctions.

The US are interested in the issue of Belarus because of two key reasons. Firstly, the democratization of Eastern Europe is still an important issue in US policy towards Europe. The problem has even growing significance due to the unfavourable development of the situation in Russia. Secondly, the US are disturbed by unclear contacts between the Belarusian authorities and countries such as Iran. This problem seems to have, at least, equal importance for Washington because it is linked with the fight against international terrorism.

The first goal of US policy towards Belarus – democratization – is supported to a significant extent by American organisations, including the National Endowment for Democracy, the National Democratic Institute for International Affairs or the International Republican Institute. As donors, they are more visible than foundations from EU Member States, in particular EU institutions, as American organisations work more flexibly and faster than EU institutions.

In sum, US policy towards Belarus seems coherent yet it is only one of many secondary issues for the White House administration in a global context. Even in Eastern Europe, Bush's administration is more focused on Ukraine, the South Caucasus and first of all Russia.

4. EU policy towards Belarus

Belarus is, in fact, an exception among CIS countries as it does not have contractual links with the EU. Indeed, the EU signed a Partnership and Co-operation Agreement with Belarus in 1995 but it never entered into life due to the antidemocratic behaviour of the Lukashenko regime after 1996. Since 1997, the EU has condemned the Belarusian authorities due to further autocratic measures introduced by Lukashenko regime against the political opposition, media and civil society. The European Council, the European Commission and the European Parliament have published many statements and the EU as a whole has introduced sanctions against the Belarusian authorities, including a visa ban for high representatives of the regime.

EU measures against Belarus were always established as a response to the actions of the Lukashenkos regime. Therefore, this kind of policy can be defined as reactive. The conditional approach has been a main tool for the development of co-operation with Belarus. Such an approach is consistent with the European Neighbourhood Policy of the EU. In the main ENP

document – European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, published in May 2004 – the Union said that *‘through the ENP, the EU will reinforce its lasting commitment to supporting democratic development in Belarus. When fundamental political and economic reforms take place, it will be possible for Belarus to make full use of the ENP. Currently however, an authoritarian system is in place in Belarus. Elections since 1996 have failed to meet international democratic standards and democratic structures are lacking. Under these circumstances, it is not yet possible to offer the full benefits of the ENP to Belarus’*. This means that, according to current policy, the EU should wait for positive changes in Belarus and then act in a more intensive manner. However, in such circumstances, EU policy could not be creative as EU assistance for Belarus, for example through the Tacis programme, is modest.

Belarus was perceived as a distant country by the EU before the enlargement of 2004. This is understandable as no then-Member States bordered Belarus and the country was actually seen as a part of Russia by many politicians within the EU. The situation has changed since the enlargement and Belarus has become a direct neighbour of the EU. New Member States, especially Lithuania and Poland – both bordering Belarus – are lobbying for deeper EU engagement in the issue of Belarus. The new political climate is visible, first of all, in the European Parliament, which voted on five resolutions concerning Belarus. In addition, the Council and Commission both pay more attention to Belarus. There are initial symptoms of pro-active policy. For example, the EU decided to support broadcast in Belarus from abroad (the support of the Deutsche Welle programme for Belarus and a 2 million euro tender for other programmes announced in autumn 2005) and to create the EU Delegation in Minsk.

The special role of Member States (Latvia, Lithuania, Poland) neighbouring Belarus is more and more visible. It should be stressed that Lithuania and Poland are much more active than Latvia. Lithuania was interested in Belarus for many years and would like to be considered an expert on Bela-

rus in the EU and therefore propose added value to EU policy towards the country. Poland has also been interested in Belarus from the beginning of 90s and is now deeply involved in the issue of Belarus due to the oppression of the Polish minority by the Lukashenko regime. Both Lithuania and Poland have close contacts with the Belarusian democratic opposition and civil society and Vilnius and Warsaw strongly support the democratisation of Belarus. But there are significant differences between Lithuania and Poland in their approach to Minsk. For instance, Lithuania supports informal meetings with the highest officials from Belarus, including Lukashenko (informal meetings between President Valdas Adamkus and Lukashenko on the border or an official meeting of the Lithuanian Prime Minister with his Belarusian counterpart are examples of such approach). Poland, on the other hand, is against such contacts but supports working meetings with lower representatives of the Belarusian regime.

It should be noted that after the Orange Revolution, Ukraine follows EU statements on Belarus. Therefore, it can be said that all neighbouring countries excluding Russia are interested in the democratization of Belarus.

Other EU Member States are active to varying degrees in Belarus. Nordic countries, Germany, Netherlands and the UK among 'old' Member States, and the Czech Republic and Slovakia among 'new' Member States, try to assist in democracy-building in Belarus. Their governments and NGOs work with Belarusian partners from civil society and the political opposition.

EU policy towards Belarus is slowly changing. But the main principles, the conditional approach for instance, still remain the same. Such policy does not correspond with the new situation in the EU after the enlargement of 2004 and the worsening conditions in Belarus. At times, EU institutions and Member States undertake different, sometimes contradictory, measures towards Belarus. In sum, it should be said that the EU has not elaborated a coherent policy towards Belarus.

5. Last months' developments

In recent months, the behaviour of Lukashenko and his collaborators has demonstrated their fear of another 'colour revolution' in Belarus. They have attempted to remove and jail potential presidential candidates and street protests organisers (Mikalay Statkevich, Pavel Sevyarynets for instance). The Belarusian authorities aim to close the last independent daily - 'Narodnaya Volya'. They fight with NGOs, the most spectacular example of which was the removal of the democratically elected leaders of *The Union of Poles of Belarus*. Lukashenko was unable to accept a strong organisation (with 25,000 members) which was not fully controlled by him as it could set a bad example. The case of *The Union of Poles of Belarus* should not be seen as a problem only in terms of Belarusian-Polish relations or as a minority issue, but first and foremost as an example of the repression of civil society in Belarus, of which the Polish minority organisation is a representative.

International contact with Belarusian civil society, students or even ordinary citizens is also a source of danger for the Lukashenko regime. The authorities know that these contacts played a significant role before and during the 'colour revolutions', especially in Ukraine. Therefore, in August 2005 Lukashenko signed a decree prohibiting Belarusian organisations and persons from accepting foreign assistance for the preparation of conferences, scholarly exchanges and elections. Instead, students who want study abroad have to obtain special permission.

Unexpectedly, Lukashenko allowed the organisation of the congress of opposition forces, which took place in October 2005. Although this could be perceived as a sign of weakness by the Lukashenko regime, the most probable explanation is that the Belarusian president expected the opposition to break apart at the congress.

In December 2005, the Lukashenko regime introduced changes to the Criminal Code. Persons seen to discredit Belarus in the international area will be penalised with jail terms of up to five years. According to the former Constitutional Court Judge Mikhail Pastukhou, amendments allow the au-

thorities *'to eliminate someone from the election process. It is sufficient to accuse him of destabilizing the situation by his speeches or discrediting the Republic of Belarus'*.

In the same month, the Belarusian parliament decided to organise presidential elections on 19 March 2006, three months earlier than it should be scheduled according to Belarusian law. This decision can be seen as a sign of concern within the Lukashenko regime. The Belarusian authorities are attempting to diminish the possibility of the democratic opposition organising an electoral campaign.

In autumn 2005, Milinkevich started his campaign in Belarus and abroad. He visited several Belarusian cities, both in the eastern and western part of country. He met with Lithuanian President Valdas Adamkus in Vilnius, the Czech Minister of Foreign Affairs Cyril Svoboda in Prague, the Polish Prime Minister Kazimierz Marcinkiewicz in Poland and the French Minister of Foreign Affairs Philippe Douste-Blazy in Paris. He also visited Moscow and officially met with representatives of the Russian parliament.

The Russian authorities still support Lukashenko due, for instance, to the very low prices of crude oil and gas. Instead, the EU repeated its demands for democratic law during the electoral campaign and presidential elections in 2006 and welcomed the selection of Milinkevich as the united opposition candidate.

6. Predictions

It is almost certain that the Lukashenko regime will undertake further antidemocratic measures before the presidential elections in March 2006. These could be focused on the further oppression of the last remaining titles of independent press and NGOs. New articles in the Criminal Code, as previously mentioned, can be used against opposition politicians, in particular Milinkevich. This could lead to the exclusion of Milinkevich from

the presidential elections, especially in the case of growing support for the opposition leader. Arrests, incarceration and even disappearances of opposition politicians, including Milinkevich, are possibilities that must be addressed.

There are at least four potential scenarios to be considered which may follow the elections:

In the first of these, the elections are falsified, there is a Lukashenko victory but a lack of street protests, eventually leading to divisions within the opposition camp. This would mean a repetition of the presidential elections of 2001. In the second potential scenario, the elections are falsified, there is a Lukashenko victory but reasonably strong street protests, resulting in the opposition remaining united with Milinkevich as leader. Tension in Belarus would build in the following months. In the third possibility, the elections are falsified, there is a Lukashenko victory but mass protests. As a result, Lukashenko could not be accepted as president and there would be a further electoral process, a scenario similar to that of the Ukraine. The fourth possibility would be the victory of Milinkevich in the elections on 19 March 2006. Whilst the latter scenario is impossible, the former three are more or less equally realizable.

Second Part – new strategy towards Belarus

The assessment of EU policy towards Belarus and the worsening situation in the country show that the EU needs a new strategy towards Belarus. Small amendments to current EU policy would be insufficient. Recent months show that this opinion is more and more accepted within the EU. Representative experts from EU institutions and Member States are looking for new solutions. It seems that the new strategy could be composed of three elements:

- a new philosophy of EU policy towards Belarus in general,
- activities,
- tools.

All three elements are described in detail below. Part of the proposal was already presented in different papers, especially in those mentioned in the Introduction section (see p. 10)

1. A new philosophy of EU policy towards Belarus – principles

The EU should have clear guidelines in its policy towards Belarus as hitherto existing policy is not coherent as pointed out above. Therefore, the creation of a list of principles concerning new EU policy towards Belarus is indispensable:

– **EU policy should be focused simultaneously on short-term goals (the presidential elections in March 2006) and long-term aims (helping to build civil society as the base for democracy in Belarus).** Both dimensions are very important. The EU cannot ignore the current political process in Belarus by saying that the opposition does not have the chance to change the situation. Rather, the EU should be aware that the issue of Belarus requires long-term engagement. The EU must find a balance between those two approaches.

– **Active not reactive policy.** The EU should abandon the conditional approach because such a method is ineffective in the case of autocratic regimes which do not want to co-operate with the Union. The EU cannot wait for the first positive step by Lukashenko before responding with a positive answer, as the Belarusian president is not interested in such a deal. In fact, the existence of the conditional approach is profitable for the Lukashenko regime because it guarantees a low level of EU engagement in the Belarus issue. It should be underlined that a change in method would require amendments to the ENP, which is presently helpless in dealing with autocratic regimes.

The EU should co-operate almost entirely with the Belarusian opposition, civil society and society as a whole rather than with the authorities. Belarusian opposition forces and NGOs share the same values as the EU and therefore the EU would be able to actively work with them and propose new measures. The EU should also be more active against the Lukashenko regime.

– **Two approaches: negative measures against the Lukashenko regime and positive measures for Belarusian society.** An active policy towards Belarus must include both positive and negative approaches at the same time. The EU could support Belarusian society despite Lukashenko's objections, whilst simultaneously punishing the regime. In this context, the question of contacts with regime's representatives of different levels does

emerge. The EU ban on contacts with the highest level of the Lukashenko regime representatives should be strictly observed. However, contacts with medium and low ranking Belarusian bureaucracy could play a positive role in the future, as many bureaucrats would remain in their positions even if regime change were to occur in Belarus. Working meetings with different Belarusian ministries seem to be indispensable for resolving the current problems between the EU and/or member states and Belarus.

– **A new kind of assistance.** The EU should look for unconventional methods of assistance to Belarus. Within the following months, further steps in adjusting EC assistance to Belarus should be made in order to increase its flexibility and effectivity. Because Belarusian authorities are neither co-operative nor interested in closer cooperation with the EU, most resources should be spent on independent initiatives. There are enough independent initiatives able to implement EU programmes if said programmes were better tailored to the conditions within the country. Many of them have already lost registration due to a decision undertaken by the Belarusian authorities. Therefore, the EU should recognise the need to directly support illegal organisations in Belarus.

– **Co-ordination within the EU.** A lack of co-ordination among different actors in the EU is visible in their efforts towards Belarus. It applies to co-operation among EU institutions (the Council, the Commission, European Parliament), relations between EU institutions and Member States, but also among Member States themselves. This situation is one of the reasons for incoherency observable in EU policy towards Belarus, because it provokes contradictory actions or duplication.

– **Co-operation with the US.** As they share the same goal, the democratization of the country, both the EU and the US could co-operate very closely in their efforts concerning Belarus. Any action towards Belarus would be less fruitful without such co-operation, both concerning assistance to Belarusian

civil society or the political opposition and measures against the Lukashenko regime. But it should be stressed that the EU must play a leading role in assisting democracy in Belarus as Belarus is primarily a European challenge. The US would play a secondary, albeit very important, role.

– **A dialogue with Russia.** This is not to say a deal with Russia on Belarus, but rather an open discussion with the Russian authorities. The EU could emphasise that Russia should not support the Lukashenko regime. Dialogue with Russia is an extremely difficult task for the EU because of internal differences within the EU (many Member States don't want to irritate the Kremlin by speaking about Belarus) but primarily because of the Russian position concerning countries between Russia and the EU, or CIS countries in general. The Russian authorities still perceive those countries as its zone of influence and have no interest in their democratisation. In such circumstances, it seems to be important to establish a dialogue on Belarus with the Russian opposition.

2. EU strategy towards Belarus – activities

The presidential elections on 19 March 2006 constitute one of the main events for Belarus in the next several years. Due to their importance, the EU should build a strategy which takes into account the elections. Therefore, EU activities towards Belarus should be broken down into three stages: firstly, activities before the presidential elections; secondly, immediately after the elections and thirdly, activities with a long-term perspective.

It must be stressed once more that EU activities should be balanced between positive activities towards Belarusian society and negative measures against the Lukashenko regime.

A. Short-term strategy – before the presidential elections scheduled for 19 March 2006

– **The preparation of the election observation mission in Belarus within the OSCE/ODIHR framework.** The Belarusian elections should be qualified as one of the most important election observation missions for the EU in 2006. It is expected that the Lukashenko regime will try to avoid the presence of international observers during the presidential elections. The Belarusian authorities can reject the demands of foreign NGOs that would like to observe the elections. Therefore, the EU could use the OSCE observation mission as the best solution for monitoring the presidential elections in Belarus. Rejecting the mission would be problematic for the Lukashenko regime as, according to documents also signed by Belarus, OSCE states have a standing invitation to observe each other's electoral proceedings.

Hence EU Member States should send long-term observers without delay and a high number of short-term observers (800–1000 persons) within the OSCE/ODIHR mission. Furthermore, the EU could financially support an OSCE/ODIHR mission in Belarus similar to the election observation's missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1990s. The Union could also consider financial support for Belarusian NGOs engaged in electoral observation as in the case of the Indonesian parliamentary elections in 1999. The EU could also try to send MPs from the European Parliament and national parliaments to Belarus.

– **The backing of Alyaksandr Milinkevich, the common candidate of the Belarusian democratic opposition for the presidential elections, during the election campaign.** Both EU institutions (the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament) and Member States should support Milinkevich's candidacy through personal meetings, declarations and so on. Support should be visible at every stage of the electoral campaign. There are several reasons for providing support. Firstly, it would be proof of solidarity

with Belarusians who fight for democracy (so as to demonstrate that they are not acting alone). Secondly, the Belarusian opposition needs a strong leader. Milinkevich can become such a personality (more likely than Uladzimir Hancharyk, the former common candidate of the opposition before the presidential elections in 2001). EU support for Milinkevich would be a sign to Belarusian society that he is an important person for Europeans and would provide the EU with a partner in Belarus, namely a united opposition with a respectable leader.

The third reason is that EU support will play a significant role in the personal security of Milinkevich. The Lukashenko regime will be more cautious in its actions against the leader of the Belarusian opposition if he is a recognised political figure in Europe rather than an anonymous figure.

– **Media support (inside and outside Belarus).** Effective and extensive radio broadcasting should be supported. The best alternatives are presented by the Project of Belarusian Association of Journalists and the “European Radio Station for Belarus” which involve Belarusian, Polish, Lithuanian and Czech NGOs. In addition, the underground press and leaflet distribution require EU backing.

– **Special aid (also financial) for people oppressed by the Belarusian authorities**

Opposition activists in Belarus must be made aware that they are not alone and that someone will help their families in case of their persecutions. The activity should be organised with the Belarusian opposition who should also pay a token amount for the special fund.

This could begin before the elections but will be probably more important following the elections. In addition, the EIDHR should (directly or indirectly) support victims of politically motivated repressions, which are steadily growing with the forthcoming elections.

– **The EU should monitor the situation in Belarus before the elections** carefully and react immediately in the case of further violations of basic democratic standards in the country. A clear statement describing the EU response should be published in the case of the undemocratic behaviour of the Belarusian authorities during the electoral campaign and presidential elections. This could include a statement that the exclusion of Milinkevich from presidential elections will be perceived by the EU as a fundamental violation of democratic rules during an electoral campaign and would provoke a serious EU response.

The reaction to undemocratic activities by the Belarusian authorities should be concrete, for instance visa bans for representatives of the Belarusian authorities who oppress the opposition and civil society during an electoral campaign (including judges, prosecutors, police). In particular, this could provide a positive answer to the appeal of the Political Council of United Democratic Forces of Belarus from December 2005 and introduce a visa ban for the individuals responsible for drafting and adopting the current Changes into the Criminal Code of Belarus which contradict the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus as well as a number of international documents signed by Belarus (the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights for instance). A statement could also give a strong signal to the Belarusian authorities that the EU is prepared to issue a visa ban to those representatives of the Belarusian authorities (members of electoral commissions, prosecutors, judges, police) who take part in electoral frauds and measures against the opposition and civil society after the elections.

The bank accounts in the EU (particularly in Austria) belonging to members of the Belarusian ruling elite should be identified and investigated. The EU could co-ordinate its efforts with Switzerland and the US. The partial freezing of assets could be considered even before the elections.

– **The EU should prepare a unilateral proposal for the EU-Belarus Action Plan.** This is vital as the EU should be prepared for negotiations with the new government in Minsk following the end of the Lukashenko era. Furthermore, a draft of the Action Plan could be a signal to the Belarusian opposition and society that the EU is developing a consistent policy towards Belarus and that it wishes to propose concrete proposals for future EU-Belarus relations. Guidelines of the draft of the Action Plan could be presented before the presidential elections (at least announcing the initiation of the draft before the elections).

– **The EU should formulate possible different EU reactions following elections, dependent on the development of the situation in Belarus.** That is to say, the EU must be ready for a range of situations in Belarus after elections.

B. Short term activities – immediately following the elections

When election fraud occurs (which will undoubtedly happen), further sanctions against the Lukashenko regime plus further support for the Belarusian opposition and civil society as a whole should be introduced.

– **The EU should strongly support opposition politicians and activists who are oppressed by the Lukashenko regime.** The EU should be very active on the issue in international organisations such as the OSCE and UN and discuss it openly with the Russian authorities. Belarusian opposition politicians and activists cannot feel abandoned by the EU.

– **The complete freezing of assets in the EU which belong to representatives of the Lukashenko regime** should be introduced. The EU could also request that other countries, for example Switzerland and the US, introduce the same measures. Introducing economic sanctions could also be considered, however any sanctions should be well focused on enterprises

which are directly or indirectly linked to the Lukashenko administration. Furthermore, the EU could place pressure on Belarus' trading partners who buy military equipment to resign from their contracts. This measure could be co-ordinated with the US.

– **Addressing president Putin and Alexander Lukashenko** with a clear statement that, if organised in undemocratic conditions, any possible referendum concerned with a Russia-Belarus union state would be considered illegitimate and illegal.

C. Long term activities

Many short-term activities could also be realised in the medium or long-term, especially if Lukashenko were to stay in power. Although Belarusian authorities are not co-operative, there are enough opportunities and partners ready to work to develop civil society and democracy in Belarus. The EU has the possibility, interest and potential to be a major player in this area in Belarus. Success could be achieved if the appropriate measures were to be taken quickly. There is not a 'lack of absorption capacity' (as sometimes stated) among Belarusian NGOs and initiatives, but rather a lack of ability of the EU to identify the correct partners and ways to support them. In EU policy, both negative measures against the Lukashenko regime and positive activities to support the building of civil society and democracy in Belarus should be implemented.

– **Further support of the opposition – training, assisting in activities within Belarus**, both in urban and rural environments. This means that the EU must also be ready to back illegal activities.

– **Further assistance in developing civil society.** This should include the support of Belarusian NGOs in their daily activities, strengthening their institutional capacities and human resources. Small independent local newspapers and bulletins (including those that operate underground) deserve

EU assistance. Also cultural projects that act independently of the Belarusian authorities (including cultural exchanges with member states) should be assisted. EU assistance should be focused not only on Minsk and a few other big cities, but also on local initiatives and small NGOs in smaller cities and the countryside. Belarusian NGOs could be involved in an information campaign on the EU which could provide unbiased counterweight to government-led anti-Western and anti-EU propaganda. The EU could also consider support for small and medium-sized enterprises as a part of an emerging new society based on democratic principles and a market economy.

It seems that Ukrainian experiences are sometimes more valuable for Belarus than experiences coming from EU Member States. Therefore, the EU could establish a common programme for EU and Ukrainian NGOs working in Belarus with their Belarusian partners, including those prohibited by the authorities.

– **Scholarships for Belarusians independent of the Belarusian authorities.** The EU as a whole and individual Member States should consider scholarships for Belarusian students, which should be granted independently of the Belarusian authorities or schools which are under the control of the current government. The International Visegrad Fund, which already has experience in this field, could administer a larger programme if support were received from the EC.

– **The facilitation of a visa regime for ordinary Belarus' citizens.** The Lukashenko regime is interested only in the self-isolation of Belarus. It has to be underlined that travel by Belarusians to the EU can also play a role in the democratisation process. Therefore, the EU should be interested in at least a half-open border with Belarus. The EU could introduce easier visa requirements for Belarusians and consider introducing visas free of charge. Such a policy would lead to further positive changes in the perception of the EU within Belarusian society.

3. Tools

The activities mentioned above cannot be realised without new instruments. Four proposals are described below:

– **An ad hoc group of Member States formed before the presidential elections (with the participation of Commission and Council representatives).** This would take the form of informal co-operation between Member States – a group of friends working together for a democratic Belarus (Nordic countries, Baltic states, Germany and the Visegrad Four) could play an important role in the creation of a new EU approach to Belarus. The group could be established before the presidential elections, but would also be needed following the elections.

– **A special EU representative for Belarus.** The decision of Javier Solana to nominate a point of contact under his authority on Belarus can be viewed as a positive step forward. The same must be said about Solana's decision to send his Personal Representative for Human Rights to Belarus to engage with representatives of civil society and to express EU concerns to President Lukashenko's government. But those efforts seem to have been insufficient. The EU needs to appoint a special EU Representative for Belarus, preferably a well-known figure such as a former politician. The Special EU Representative would inform EU institutions of the current situation in Belarus, of EU-Belarus relations, and would propose measures to be undertaken by the EU towards Belarus. Moreover, he or she would make and maintain contacts with representatives of Belarusian civil society, opposition forces and authorities.

– **The EU Delegation in Minsk.** The Commission's decision from November 2005 to open a regional delegation in Minsk is also a sign of the growing EU interest towards Belarus. A regional delegation, under the authority of the Head of Commission Delegation in Ukraine, seems to be a sufficient tool due to the state of EU-Belarus relations. The daily presence of EU diplomats in Minsk is more important than a range of delegations.

The situation in the country is rapidly changing. Therefore, in a long-term perspective, an EU presence would also be helpful after the presidential elections. The delegation of the European Commission should be established in Minsk within 2006. An information campaign concerned with the EU should thus become one of the priorities of the new delegation.

– **The European Democracy Agency.** The Commission has decided to implement existing instruments such as the European Initiative for Democracy and Human Rights and the Decentralised Co-operation Instruments in 2005–2006 in its efforts to encourage democracy in Belarus. Although this is a step in the right direction, the EU could also consider creating a new instrument which would act as a tool for EU measures both in Belarus and in autocratic regimes more generally.

The office of Edward Mc Millan-Scott, Vice-President of the European Parliament, proposed a concept paper in May 2005 for the establishment of a European Democracy Agency (EDA). Such an agency could be similar to the US National Endowment for Democracy or the British Westminster Foundation for Democracy. The main goal of the EDA would be to support the development of democracy in countries presently suffering under dictatorships. The EDA should be funded from the EU budget and voluntary contributions from Member States but would be more independent than existing EU institutions and the programmes responsible for the distribution of EU assistance. The European Parliament could become the body responsible for the election of the EDA Board of Directors and the EDA would present an annual report to the European Parliament for approval. It is crucial that the agency could support both registered and unregistered entities (in the latter case, the grant agreement would be signed with individuals). Grants could be spent on a range of democratic initiatives, including the publication of illegal newspapers and brochures. The EDA should operate in a faster and more flexible way than existing EU institutions and projects should be evaluated not longer than three months after submission.

Selected publications issued in the project: European Choice for Belarus:

Towards unity. Belarusian opposition before the presidential elections (2005); policy brief analyses situation inside Belarusian opposition after the Congress of Democratic Forces in October 2005. Available in Polish and English.

Effective policy towards Belarus. A Challenge for the enlarged EU (2005); paper presents proposals for the EU policy towards Belarus. Published in cooperation with Association for International Affairs (Prague). Available in English.

Belarus Catching up with Europe (2004); summary of the study elaborated by Belarusian experts featuring proposals of political, economic, social and educational reforms of the country and record of the discussion on possibilities of realisation of the reforms in Belarus. Available in Polish, English and Ukrainian.

Belarus. Reform Scenarios (2003); a comprehensive study by Belarusian experts featuring proposals of political, economic, social, and educational reforms of the country. Available in English, Russian and Belarusian.

Selected publications issued in the project: The Enlarged EU and Ukraine: New Relations

Will the Orange Revolution bear fruit? EU–Ukraine relations in 2005 and the beginning of 2006 (2005). The paper analyses the policy of the EU towards Ukraine and Ukrainian policy towards the EU after the Orange Revolution as well as gives recommendations and proposals for both the EU and Ukraine regarding their future relations Available in Polish, English and Ukrainian.

More than Neighbours. The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New Relations. Final Report (2004). Proposals dedicated to relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine elaborated by the group of experts from the EU, the accessing countries and Ukraine. Available in Polish, English and Ukrainian.

More than Neighbours. The Enlarged European Union and Ukraine – New Relations. Policy Paper (2004). Recommendations related to relations between the enlarged European Union and Ukraine elaborated by the group of experts from the EU, the accessing countries and Ukraine.

Droga do Europy. Opinie ukraińskich elit [Road to Europe. Opinions of Ukrainian Elites] (2004); collection of 30 interviews with politicians, scientists, journalists, entrepreneurs and artists on the status of Ukraine in Europe and perspectives of European choice. Among the speakers are Leonid Kravchuk, Oleksandr Moroz, Yulia Mostova, Myroslav Popovych, Petro Symonenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, Viktor Yushchenko and Taras Vozniak. Available in Polish.

More than a Neighbour – proposals for the EU's future policy towards Ukraine (2003), edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki, Olexander Sushko, Marius Vahl, Kataryna Wolczuk. Available in English and Ukrainian.

Polska–Ukraina. Współpraca organizacji pozarządowych [Poland–Ukraine. Co-operation of Non-Governmental Organisations] (2003); a presentation of Polish organisations' experience of co-operation with Ukraine, a description of activities and major institutions; published in association with the Education for Democracy Foundation. Available in Polish.

These and more publications are available on:
www.batory.org.pl/english/intl/ukraina_pub.htm

Selected publications in the series:

On the Future of Europe

O przyszłości Europy. Głosy polityków [On the Future of Europe. The Voices of Politicians] (2000), a selection of articles by European politicians expressing their opinion in the public debate in the EU about the future of the continent. Available in Polish.

Policy Paper 1: Overcoming Alienation; Kaliningrad as a Russian Enclave Inside the European Union (2001); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Andrzej Wilk; published in association with the 'Borussia' Culture Society and the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 2: The Half-Open Door; the Eastern Border of the Enlarged European Union (2001); edited by Jakub Boratyński and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Institute of Public Affairs. Available in Polish, English and Russian.

Policy Paper 3: Pro-European Atlantists. Poland and Other Countries of Central and Eastern Europe after Accession to the European Union (2001); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki and Olaf Osica; published in association with the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 4: The Forgotten Neighbour – Belarus in the Context of EU Eastern Enlargement (2001); edited by Anna Naumczuk, Eugeniusz Mironowicz, Grzegorz Gromadzki and Paweł Kazanecki; published in association with the East-European Democratic Center – IDEE. Available in Polish, English, Russian and Belarusian.

Policy Paper 5: The Common Challenge. Members and Candidates Facing the EU Future Migration Policy (2001); edited by Krystyna Iglicka, Sławomir Łodziński, Dariusz Stola, Jakub Boratyński and Grzegorz Gromadzki; pub-

lished in association with the Institute of Public Affairs and the Institute of Social Studies – Warsaw University. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 6: New Neighbourhood – New Association. Ukraine and the European Union at the beginning of the 21st century (2002); edited by Bogumiła Berdychowska, Przemysław Żurawski vel Grajewski and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Faculty of of International Studies and Political Science – University of Łódź, and the Polish-Ukrainian Forum. Available in Polish, English, Russian and Ukrainian.

Policy Paper 7: An Overview of European (In)Security (2002); edited by Olaf Osica and Grzegorz Gromadzki; published in association with the Center for International Relations. Available in Polish and English.

Policy Paper 8: Between Need and Dependency. Russian Gas in the Energy Balance of the Enlarged EU (2002); edited by Grzegorz Gromadzki. Available in Polish, English and Russian.

Poland in the World: Challenges, Achievements, Threats (2003); address by the Polish Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, and the records of discussion featuring Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, Jerzy Jedlicki, Maciej Łętowski, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Dariusz Rosati and Aleksander Smolar. Available in Polish and English.

The EU Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy (2003); the proceedings of a conference organised by the Foundation in co-operation with the Polish Foreign Ministry; the publication includes the keynote addresses by Polish President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Foreign Minister Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, a summary of all sessions, and the Polish non-paper with proposals on the future policy of the enlarged EU towards its new Eastern neighbours. Available in Polish and English.

Poland's Foreign Policy: Continuation or a Break with the Past? (2004); publication containing a record of the debate organised by the Stefan Batory Foundation. The debate featured, among others, Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz, Lena Kolarska-Bobińska, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Andrzej Olechowski, Dariusz Rosati and Aleksander Smolar. The publication also contains the results of a questionnaire on today status and priorities of Polish foreign policy, carried out among the politicians. Available in Polish and English.

New Geopolitics of Central and Eastern Europe. Between European Union and United States (2005); the proceedings of the conference organized by the Stefan Batory Foundation in co-operation with the German Institute for International and Security Affairs of the Foundation for Science and Policy, SWP, Berlin, and the European Studies Centre at St Antony's College, University of Oxford. The publication includes statements of politicians and experts, followed by discussions, the addresses by Polish Secretary of State Adam D. Rotfeld and EU Commissioner Danuta Hübner, and a special lecture by the former US Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger. Available in English.

These and more publications are available on:
www.batory.org.pl/english/pub/index.htm

